

26 February 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Coordination of Requirements

REFERENCE: Memorandum of 1 February to
IAC Representatives

PARTICIPANTS: Buford, Trezise, State; Capt. Staley, JIG;
Cmdr. McKinney, ONI; Col. Montgomery,
Mr. Guenther, G-2; Col. Berry, Air Force;

25X1A

25X1A9a

1. [REDACTED] opened the discussion by summing up the background of the establishment of the National Intelligence Priority Objectives and the IAC instructions to this group for a review of the matter of conforming intelligence and collection requirements to those priority objectives. He skipped lightly over Tab A asking that the group advise on Tab B, a proposal for two new committees on intelligence requirements and collection tasks. He added that the author of Tab B does not insist that a committee is necessarily the best device to codify intelligence requirements, but that intelligence requirements should be codified by some means.

25X1A9a

2. [REDACTED] pointed out that Tab B was not a CIA position and that it had been discussed internally with no unanimity of views. He suggested, therefore, that this inter-agency group should consider its discussion of the Tab B proposal as exploratory and without prejudice.

25X1A9a

3. [REDACTED] noted that some views in CIA bearing on the Tab B proposal as follows:

a. That collection requirements and collection generally can best be described as chaotic.

CONFIDENTIAL

b. That there is no system for priority assignments of collection tasks.

c. That those who hold these views are less concerned with duplication than with the lack of machinery to accommodate priority requirements and to assure that the more capable collector is assigned the collection task.

d. That there is no continuing direction of requirements from the Priority National Intelligence Objectives set forth in DCID 4/4.

25X1A9a

[REDACTED] then suggested that he would appreciate discussion in terms of whether we are in need of major new machinery or procedures to introduce more order into the collection processes or whether our present system is working well.

4. Capt. Staley said that he was present not as a collector, as the JIG does not collect intelligence, but was interested in education with respect to the collection systems as the Joint Staff is receiving many questions from JCS and the Defense level with respect to collection requirements. Mr. Buford stated that the arrangements for the requirements for intelligence production are well established.

5. Col. Montgomery stated that he thought it a good idea to review intelligence collection but stated that he preferred to consider any corrective action in terms of filling intelligence gaps. He felt at the present time that gaps were reflected in the Priority Intelligence Objectives themselves and in the research programs. (He added, incidentally, that a requirement to review DCID 4/4 in six months does not permit G-2 adequate time to prove or disprove the adequacy of the last intelligence objectives.) He felt that ad hoc requirements were a separate problem from the construction of guide-type requirements and felt that there was no way to codify ad hoc requirements. With regard to guide-type requirements, he was at a loss to see how the proposed committee could construct such an over-all list. Referencing the use of USCIB master requirements list, he said that that list hurt intelligence collection more than it helped. Col. Montgomery explained that G-2 assigns priority collection based on DCID 4/4 and Departmental needs

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2001/08/27 : CIA-RDP61S00750A000700060017-9

and that this is done by the collection officers to prevent research officers from concentrating collection on some specific and lesser priority requirement. He pointed out that, different from CIA, the services would not order the priority of collection in the field but could only attempt to guide. The actual collection authority stems from commanding officers. Col. Montgomery also pointed out that in the field there is machinery to coordinate collection (under NSCID-2 by the senior U.S. official). Col. Montgomery questioned the ability of any committee to coordinate all this collection machinery. He referred again to the use of a list stating that it is too inflexible and hurts collection; for example, placing a low priority item on a high priority area ahead of a high priority item on a low priority area. Such a list, he said, can best be used only as a guide.

6. All the services referred to the Military Essential Elements of Information (EEI) which are constructed with Priority National Intelligence Objectives as well as departmental needs as guides. It was pointed out that only the commanding officers can, in the last analysis, decide what item receives a top priority.

7. Mr. Gaunther and other service representatives advised that the need is not for more guides but rather for more collection personnel. He added, with respect to coordination of the Army's SRI's (Specific Request for Information), that when they are levied on the field a copy is given to CIA/OCD for determination of the availability of the information in Washington.

8. Mr. Buford felt that the field is getting sufficient guide requirements but that closer liaison between collectors and producers would improve levying a specific ad hoc requirement. He felt that ad hoc requirements was an area in which collection coordination might be improved but that these certainly were not susceptible to a central codified listing.

9. There was considerable discussion along the lines that current guides for intelligence collection is the area to be improved. This can be summed up as susceptible to solution only case by case and between the affected parties.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Approved For Release 2001/08/27 : CIA-RDP61S00750A000700060017-9

10. Commander McKinney of the Navy felt that the way to improve the intelligence collection was to improve existing machinery rather than to attempt any central over-all new machinery.

11. Col. Berry, Air Force, expressed the same thoughts as McKinney and added that the Air Force has felt that daily collection requirements (guide-type requirements being already adequate) were too dynamic to be susceptible to codification as there were too many variables involved such as time, area and categories.

12. It was not made clear in the discussion what could be accomplished by a collectors committee or group. Mr. Buford pointed out that from time to time he would appreciate an opportunity to discuss collection problems informally with a group of collectors.

NEXT STEP:

25X1A9a 13. [REDACTED] suggested that he and his staff would try to crystalize certain questions with respect to collection and one or two conclusions which could then be sent around to the members of the group for discussion in two or three weeks.

25X1A9a 14. Col. Montgomery commented that Tab A was in error in some parts and that in the main it was a CIA paper with little reference to the services. It was explained to Montgomery that the paper was a first effort and was only as good as the knowledge of its authors. [REDACTED] was requested to discuss with Col. Montgomery, and others as appropriate, whether it would be worthwhile to correct Tab A and, of course, to include appropriate descriptions of collection systems not adequately covered. Some thought that the paper might be useful as a description of the collection system which is understood only in part by intelligence officers. The paper, if revised, should not attempt to evaluate any collection system but merely be descriptive of what exists.

[REDACTED] 25X1A9a
Office of the Director
Planning and Coordination Staff

Approved For Release 2001/08/27 : CIA-RDP61S00750A000700060017-9

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~